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ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION AND 

THE FIRST AMENDMENT 

. THOMAS G. KELCH* 
INTRODUCTION 
Caustic liquid is dropped into the eye of a rabbit. Apes' skulls 
are crushed. Animals are force fed lethal doses of chemicals. Crip­
pling injuries are inflicted on animals. Electric shocks are adminis­
tered. Animals are baked, burned, crushed, deprived, beaten, 
blinded, and starved. What do all of these practices have in com­
mon? According to some, the common element is protection under 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.! 
It is curious to speak about the conduct described above as be­
ing one of constitutional right. Nonetheless, numerous arguments 
have been made to this effect. Probably the most cogent of these 
arguments is that although scientific experimentation is not itself a 
form of speech, it is a "necessary prerequisite" to scientific speech 
and, as such, is entitled to protection under the First Amendment.2 
In this view there is such an intimate connection between the con­
duct of experiments and speech relating to such experiments that 
the former is subject to the same First Amendment protection as 
the latter. The goal of this Article is to show that this argument is 
untenable, and that there is no foundation for the claim that animal 
experimentation is a First Amendment right. 
To achieve this aim, I propose the following hypothetical stat­
ute as a backdrop for discussion. Assume that Congress, based on 
* Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. I am much indebted to Taime Bryant, 
David Favre, and Stephen Wise for their insightful and useful comments on an t:arlier 
draft of this Article. Many thanks are also due to my research assistant, Diane Agor, 
Whittier Law School, Class of 2000, for her research help in writing this article. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing for the right to free speech). 
2. Stephen L. Carter, The Bellman, the Snark, and the Biohazard Debate, 3 YALE 
L. & POL'y REv. 358, 375 (1985). . 
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what it determined to be legitimate policy concerns founded on 
both human and animal interests, passed a law that prohibited pain­
ful animal experimentation.3 The law is based on policies of 
preventing the pain and suffering of animals, avoiding the harden­
ing of humans to such suffering, and a feeling of moral obligation to 
prevent this suffering. Could this law survive an attack on the 
ground that it violates First Amendment rights of animal 
researchers? 
To answer this question, Part I of this Article reviews and ana­
lyzes arguments that have been made asserting that the First 
Amendment does provide protection for scientific experimentation. 
Part II then argues that, as a restriction on conduct, a prohibition 
on animal experimentation does not differ from myriad other re­
strictions on conduct that also have an impact on speech. These 
other restrictions on conduct, justified by health, safety, moral, edu­
cational, national security, and other policy goals, are not thought 
to have serious First Amendment implications. 
To argue that scientific experimentation is not subject to the 
same kind of regulation as other conduct, it must be asserted that 
there is something distinctive about science that frees it from regu­
lation. In considering this issue it is important to keep in mind that 
it would be criminal for a common person to engage in the painful 
animal "experimentation" described above-such conduct consti­
tutes cruelty to animals for ordinary members of the common­
wealth. For those given the appellation "scientist," however, this 
barbarous conduct is not only non-criminal but is defended as a 
matter of constitutional right. It is in this mystical transformation 
of a human from a "common person" to a "scientist" that lies the 
foundation of the argument that animal experimentation is a matter 
of First Amendment right. To say that the conduct of painful 
animal experimentation garners constitutional protection requires 
that special value be placed on science-it must occupy a unique 
place in our constitutional history and concepts. This privileged 
ground set aside for science is, nonetheless, a mythical domain 
3. I leave the precise contours of this law intentionally vague. The intent of this 
exercise is not to engender debate concerning the nature and scope of this law. All that 
is necessary is to know that the law prohibits painful animal experimentation. Professor 
David Favre has proposed a federal law aimed at painful animal experiments. David 
Favre, Laboratory Animal Act: A Legislative Proposal, 3 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 123 
app. at 153-64 (1986). While this proposal would ban certain types of painful experi­
ments, it would allow some painful experiments to be performed by persons obtaining 
permits under the proposed law. Id. at 144-46, 155-57, 158-59. The presently proposed 
hypothetical statute would prohibit all painful experiments. 
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populated with fallacious ideas and a view of science that has not 
been accepted, except perhaps by a gullible public, for decades.4 
The thesis of this Article is that there is nothing special about 
science or animal experimentation that provides either with a dis­
tinctive place in First Amendment jurisprudence; therefore, the law 
may regulate animal experimentation . free from First Amendment 
concerns. Neither history, court decision, nor the nature of science 
itself justifies unique treatment of scientific experimentation under 
the First Amendment. 
I. 	 SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTATION AND THEORIES OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. 	 The Relationship Between Scientific Experiments and the First 
Amendment 
Scientific experiments generally involve manipulation of physi­
cal objects. These manipulations, conducted as they ordinarily are 
in the laboratory without any communicative intent, are not speech. 
Just because particular conduct may ultimately be utilized in some 
communication to others does not make the conduct itself a com­
munication subject to First Amendment protection.5 Animal ex­
periments are generally of this nature; they do not themselves 
involve communication, but rather are manipulations of biological 
organisms that may eventually be used in communications. As a 
result, it is generally accepted that experimentation itself does not 
constitute "pure speech" protected by the First Amendment.6 It is, 
of course, possible that an experiment itself may be a communica­
tive event. For example, in the social sciences, experiments often 
involve the gathering of information through surveys and inter­
views.7 In these cases, the research process does involve communi­
cation and, in this respect, is subject to First Amendment 
protection.8 
It has been argued that scientific experimentation is subject to 
4. See infra Part II.A-B for a discussion of arguments that science is protected by 
the First Amendment. 
5. Gary L. Francione, Experimentation and the Marketplace Theory of the First 
Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 417, 441-42 (1987) (stating that scientific experimenta­
tion is not always expressive conduct). 
6. Comment, Considerations in the Regulation of Biological Research, 126 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1420, 1427 (1978) ("Conducting an experiment is clearly not an example of 
pure speech."). 
7. Francione, supra note 5, at 447. 
8. Id. 
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First Amendment protection as pure speech since "scientific 
method," presumably used in all such experiments, involves the 
symbolic representation of events, which makes the experimenta­
tion itself communicative.9 Here the idea is that science proceeds 
under certain rules that are expressed in a symbolic system, and the 
application of these rules to objects constitutes speech that is pro­
tected by the First Amendment. lO The difficulty with this argument 
is that, if accurate, all activities governed by rules set in a symbolic 
scheme, like a baseball game, are communicative events subject to 
. First Amendment protection. l1 However, we do not view baseball 
as protected speech because of its rule-based character. Therefore, 
it appears unfruitful to try to label typical scientific experiments as 
pure speech subject to First Amendment protection under this or 
any other theory P 
Since scientific experimentation is not protected as pure 
speech, it is frequently claimed that scientific experiments are pro­
tected as a form of conduct that contains elements of speech.13 
Conduct of this kind, which combines speech and non-speech ele­
ments, is subject to First Amendment protection, but to a lesser 
extent than pure speech.14 To be subject to First Amendment pro­
9. Id. at 448 & n.110. 
10. Id. at 448 (referring to this as a "scientific method" of communication). 
11. /d. 
12. It is worth noting that even pure speech may be subject to regulation in line 
with the First Amendment if there is a present danger of imminent lawlessness. See 
Michael D. Davidson, Note, First Amendment Protection for Biomedical Research, 19 
ARIZ. L. REV. 893, 915 (1977). It may also be regulated where it is defamatory or 
obscene. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978) (holding that offensive 
language on the radio may be regulated); David Favre & Matthew McKinnon, The New 
Prometheus: Will Scientific Inquiry Be Bound by the Chains of Government Regula­
tion?, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 651, 684-85 (1981) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)) (noting that obscenity is not pro­
tected by the First Amendment). Pure speech may also be prohibited where it inter­
feres with national security concerns. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 
990,1000 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (deciding that dissemination of information relating to crea­
tion of nuclear bombs may be prohibited). Pure speech may also be banned where it 
conflicts with educational goals or school-sponsored activities. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988). 
13. See Natasha C. Lisman, Freedom of Scientific Research: A Frontier Issue in 
First Amendment Law, BOSTON B.l., Nov.lDec. 1991, at 4 (suggesting that the First 
Amendment protects "conduct closely intertwined" with speech); Roy G. Spece, Jr. & 
Jennifer Weinzierl, First Amendment Protection of Experimentation: A Critical Review 
and Tentative Synthesis/Reconstruction of the Literature, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 185, 
214 (1998) (arguing that experimentation is expressive conduct). 
14. Richard Delgado et aI., Can Science Be Inopportune? Constitutional Validity 
of Governmental Restrictions on Race-IQ Research, 31 UCLA L. REV. 128, 166 (1983) 
(noting the standard of review is lower for conduct including speech than for speech 
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tection in this regard, the person claiming protection for "symbolic 
conduct" must prove that the First Amendment applies to the con­
duct.15 In order to meet this burden, it is necessary to show that 
there was an intent in the conduct to communicate a message to an 
observer who would understand the message being conveyed.16 An 
obvious case of this type of conduct is the burning of the American 
flagY However, scientific research is not ordinarily meant to be a 
communication or a symbolic event designed to communicate to 
third persons.18 Scientific experiments are generally performed in 
private, and the conduct that constitutes the experiment is not in­
tended to communicate anything to anyone. Although it is non­
public conduct that might ultimately be used in communications to 
others, it is not itself intended to be a communication. Therefore, 
animal experimentation does not typically qualify for First Amend­
ment protection as symbolic conduct. 
Since scientific experimentation is not ordinarily subject to 
First Amendment protection as either pure speech or as symbolic 
conduct, those claiming constitutional protection for scientific re­
search must look elsewhere for a justification. The most cogent ar­
gument in favor of protecting scientific experimentation as speech 
is that such experimentation is so intimately connected to pure sci­
entific speech-the publication or other communication of experi­
mental results-that it deserves protection as a necessary 
antecedent to this pure scientific speech.19 Stephen Carter states 
alone); Favre & McKinnon, supra note 12, at 684-92 (discussing the lower standard 
applied to scientific inquiry); John A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right To Research: A 
Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1253 (1977-78) (noting that states 
more often successfully regulate conduct than content); cf Davidson, Note, supra note 
12, at 915 (noting that if research involves both speech and conduct, regulation of it is 
subject to a lower standard of review than pure speech). 
15. Cf Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (indi­
cating that the First Amendment protects some expressive conduct); Francione, supra 
note 5, at 436-38 (noting that one engaging in experimental conduct has the burden to 
show protection under the First Amendment). 
16. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam) (setting forth 
this test for First Amendment protection); see also Favre & McKinnon, supra note 12, 
at 670 (discussing the Spence decision). 
17. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag-burning case). 
18. Delgado et a!., supra note 14, at 160-61. It is possible for an experiment to be 
symbolic conduct, such as when an experiment is conducted in public to communicate 
to an audience. This is, of course, not the case with most experiments and is not the 
prototype experiment for which First Amendment protection is sought. Spece, Jr. & 
Weinzierl, supra note 13, at 197 (discussing Delgado's view); Comment, supra note 6, at 
1427 (noting there is no "obviously expressive content" in scientific research). 
19. Carter, supra note 2, at 368-69 (setting forth the argument but not endorsing 
it); James R. Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. 
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the arguments as follows: 
(1) Scientific speech ... is entitled to a heavy degree of First 
Amendment protection. 
(2) If a form of speech is protected, then that which is a nec­
essary prerequisite to it is protected. 
(3) Scientific experiment is a necessary prerequisite to sci­
entific speech .... 
(4) Therefore, scientific experiment[ation] is protected 
[speech].20 
Several modifications are necessary to put this argument in its 
most defensible form. The first premise should be modified to say 
simply that scientific speech is "protected" speech, since it has not 
been established that this speech is entitled to special protection.21 
Second, we must refine what is meant by experimentation being a 
prerequisite to scientific speech. Many things, like eating, sleeping, 
etc., are prerequisites to the exercise of First Amendment rights, 
but these prerequisites are not entitled to constitutional protection. 
Thus, there must be some subset of prerequisites to scientific 
speech concerning animal experiments that are subject to First 
Amendment protection. To be such a prerequisite to speech the 
conduct in question must be "essential" to the speech.22 More spe­
cifically, it must be "essential to the meaningful exercise" of First 
Amendment rights, given the policies behind the First 
Amendment.23 
This "essentiality" requires a relation between the alleged pre­
requisite to speech and policies underlying the First Amendment.24 
While many policies ground First Amendment rights, four are fre­
quently cited as primary: 
(1) Individual self-fulfillment. 
(2) Advancement of knowledge. 
(3) Allowing participation by all in the political decision-mak­
mg process. 
REV. 639, 649-51 (1979); Robertson, supra note 14, at 1216-17; John A. Robertson, The 
Law of Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV. 484, 502-03 (1979); Spece, Jr. & 
Weinzierl, supra note 13, at 193 (discussing Robertson, supra note 14). 
20. Carter, supra note 2, at 368-69. 
21. See infra Part II for a discussion of the argument that science deserves a spe­
cial place in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
22. See Ferguson, supra note 19, at 650-51; Robertson, supra note 14, at 1217; 
Spece, Jr. & Weinzierl, supra note 13, at 214. 
23. Favre & McKinnon, supra note 12, at 672. 
24. Id. 
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(4) Achievement of a more adaptable and stable community.25 
Individual self-fulfillment is thought to be enhanced by the de­
velopment of the individual intellect through acquiring information 
in an attempt to discover the truth.26 This policy presumably ap­
plies to experimentation, which not only aids in reaching the utilita­
rian goals of advancing science, but also in providing self-fulfillment 
for scientists that engage in experimentation. Animal experiments 
are also claimed to advance knowledge in medical and other fields, 
and, thus, may further the second policy supporting the First 
Amendment as previously articulated. 
Further, the First Amendment serves social values in a democ­
racy by providing information for political decision-makingP 
Some argue that the political aspects of the First Amendment are 
its only true purpose.28 Nonetheless, painful animal experiments 
themselves do not appear to further such a purpose, although the 
results of experiments may sometimes be used in political decision­
making. The information garnered from animal experiments may 
also be argued to promote a more adaptable and stable society. 
While scientific experiments do not serve all of the policies behind 
the First Amendment, they do further some of its policy bases, and 
therefore can be viewed as meeting the proposed "essentiality" 
requirement. 
The second premise, which states that necessary prerequisites 
to speech are protected by the First Amendment, is the most dubi­
ous aspect of the necessary prerequisite argument. This premise is 
said to be supported by cases like Buckley v. Valeo.29 In Buckley 
the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of restrictions 
25. Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward 
Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REv. 349, 362-69 (1978) 
(discussing these four policies); Thomas 1. Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current 
Realities ofthe First Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 737, 740-45 (1977) (same); Lisman, 
supra note 13, at 5 (same); see also Favre & McKinnon, supra note 12, at 672 (noting 
self-fulfillment and societal goals as policies behind the First Amendment). 
26. Favre & McKinnon, supra note 12, at 673-75. 
27. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L.J. 1, 23-30 (1971) (discussing the importance of free speech in the political 
arena); see also Favre & McKinnon, supra note 12, at 675 ("Underlying both the inter­
est of the individual and the interest of society is a fundamental premise that individuals 
and governments will make the best decisions only when they have the most reliable 
information available."). 
28. Bork, supra note 27, at 20 ("Constitutional protection should be accorded 
only to speech that is explicitly political. "). 
29. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
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on campaIgn contributions under the First Amendment.3o The 
Court distinguished between restrictions on contributions to politi­
cal parties (which the Court held constitutional,) and restrictions on 
direct spending of money by entities to promote political candidates 
(which the Court found to violate the First Amendment).31 Those 
who ascribe to the necessary prerequisite argument advocate, based 
on Buckley, that since spending money-a necessary prerequisite to 
advertising and promoting political candidates-may be protected 
under the First Amendment, experimentation as a necessary pre­
requisite to scientific speech may also be protected.32 
This is not the only way to interpret Buckley. Remember that 
the Court distinguished contributing to political parties from per­
sonally spending money to promote candidates. The latter act, 
spending personal funds to support a candidate, may itself be 
speech.33 That is, spending money on advertising for a candidate is 
speech, since it is an expression of support for that candidate.34 As 
such, in protecting the direct spending of money to promote candi­
dates, the Court is not protecting a necessary prerequisite to 
speech, but rather is protecting speech itself. 
If this is the proper distinction [the distinction between di­
rectly spending money on advertising where there is creative con­
trol over the advertising and contributing money to a party where 
such control is passed to the political party] - and I confess that 
. explaining Buckley is not an easy task - then Judge J. Skelly 
Wright, who later wrote an article on the decision, correctly un­
derstood it when he argued that the Justices were holding that 
the expenditure of money is itself speech. This rule may be a 
good one or a bad one - I have argued elsewhere that it is a bad 
one - but it is at bottom the only explanation that makes sense. 
Viewed from this perspective, Buckley has nothing to do with 
protecting what is required in order to engage in some constitu­
tionally protected activity. Its rule instead covers an activity - the 
purchase of advertising for independent support of a candidate ­
that is itself protected. The expenditure is not protected because 
30. Id. at 6-7 (per curiam). 
31. Id. at 44-45 (per curiam); see also Carter, supra note 2, at 375-76 (discussing 
the Buckley decision). 
32. See Carter, supra note 2, at 375-76 (noting this argument extending the Buck­
ley holding to scientific research); Lisman, supra note 13 at 5-6 (applying the reasoning 
and holding in Buckley to the field of scientific experimentation). 
33. Carter, supra note 2, at 375. 
34. See id. at 376. 
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it will lead to speech; it is protected because, in the judgment of 
the Court, the expenditure is speech. 
Thus to rely on Buckley - even granting the proposition that 
the case is rightly decided - the supporter of free scientific inquiry 
is forced to make by far the more difficult argument, that scien­
tific research is speech. This contention would naturally run up 
against the speech/conduct distinction I have mentioned before; 
it is in any event a position that seems counter-intuitive, and, per­
haps as a consequence, is difficult to support.35 
If this is a correct interpretation, the ruling in Buckley does not 
support a necessary prerequisite argument.36 
In fact, it can be argued that the case of contributions to politi­
cal parties is a better example of a necessary prerequisite than is the 
personal use of funds to promote a candidate.37 The point of mak­
ing a contribution to a political party is to promote a particular can­
didate and platform, presumably through the mechanism of speech. 
The obtaining of such funds is a necessary prerequisite to this 
speech since it is not possible for a political party to engage in pro­
mption without money. Nonetheless, the Court in Buckley found 
that the conduct of contributing to political parties, the prerequisite 
to speech by these parties, can be regulated.38 
The necessary prerequisite argument is thought, nonetheless, 
to find support elsewhere. It is asserted that because entities en­
gaged in news-gathering are protected by the First Amendment, in­
dividuals performing scientific research are similarly protected.39 
Research, like news-gathering, performs an informative func­
don4°-it increases the amount of information available to the pub­
35. Id. at 375-76 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
36. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Buckley 
case and ruling. 
37. It should also be noted that the act of contributing to a political party can be 
seen as pure speech-an expression of support for the party. The fact that it can be 
restricted in an effort to avoid corruption shows us one circumstance in which pure 
speech can be regulated. 
38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976) ("A contribution serves as a gen­
eral expression of support ... but does not communicate the underlying basis for the 
support. "). 
39. Favre & McKinnon, supra note 12, at 682; Robertson, supra note 19, at 502-06 
(comparing a journalist's right to gather information with the scientist's right to gather 
information in research). But see Francione supra note 5, at 466-72 (disagreeing with 
the analogy between news-gathering and scientific research); Spece, Jr. & Weinzierl, 
supra note 13, at 188-89 (noting this suggested analogy but disagreeing with its 
accuracy). 
40. See Robert M. O'Neil, Scientific Research and the First Amendment: An Aca­
demic Privilege, 16 U.c. DAVIS L. REv. 837,848 (1983). 
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lic. Also like newsgathering, scientific research, especially in the 
social sciences, places value on confidentiality of sources.41 Both 
are also activities covered by academic disciplines. 
There is case law support for the proposition that the press 
does have a right to access certain information for the purpose of 
reporting the news.42 This right to access is derived from a right to 
acquire information that, in turn, is based on a right to receive in­
formation.43 The First Amendment protects one's right to receive 
information and ideas regardless of their social worth. For exam­
ple, Stanley v. Georgia44 holds that adults have the right to possess 
obscene material in their own homes without government 
interference.45 
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the 
right to receive information and ideas .... This right to receive 
information and ideas regardless of their social worth .. , is fun­
damental to our free society. 
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a 
State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own 
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.46 
Similarly, receipt of information relating to contraception has been 
held to be protected by a "zone of privacy" emanating from the 
penumbra of the Bill of Rights.47 One can argue that since one has 
a right to receive obscene material, the right to make commercial 
communications, and even the right to receive uncensored commu­
nications by mail while in prison, scientific research should be the 
subject of even greater protection.48 
Based on this right to receive information, it is claimed that 
scientists should have the right to carryon research, that is, to re­
ceive information from willing subjects and objects under their 
control. 
41. Id. at 848-49. 
42. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982) (discussing 
the right of the press to access criminal trials); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 
249 (9th Cir. 1971) (stating that "news-gathering is an integral part of news dissemina­
tion"; however, "[t]he First Amendment has never been construed to accord newsman 
immunity from torts or crimes"). 
43. Robertson, supra note 19, at 504; see also Davidson, supra note 12, at 898-900; 
Robertson, supra note 14, at 1221-23 (discussing the right to receive information). 
44. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
45. Id. at 564. 
46. Id. at 564-65 (citations omitted). 
47. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965). 
48. Robertson, supra note 14, at 1221-23. 
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If individuals have a First Amendment right to acquire infor­
mation from willing sources, then the acquisition of knowledge 
and information by scientists in the research process should also 
be protected by the First Amendment because in the research 
process scientists seek to acquire or receive information from 
willing collaborators or from materials under their lawful control. 
In some research activities, scientists seek to acquire existing and 
transmittable information from willing sources. In other re­
search, the researchers wish to acquire information not yet in ex­
istence by manipulating or experimenting with willing 
collaborators or materials under their lawful control. Whether 
the information that the scientists seek to acquire or receive al­
ready exists or remains to be developed through experimentation 
should have no constitutional significance. In both cases re­
searchers are seeking to acquire or receive information and ideas, 
and in both cases they must give the source a signal to begin the 
flow of information. If acquisition by listening, observing, or 
reading is protected when the government seeks to prevent com­
munication with a willing source, then, as the right-to-receive 
cases show, the steps that initiate or make possible the flow of 
information from sources and materials must also be protected. 
Thus, the constitutional right to acquire information, implied in 
the right to receive, constitutes a right to research, including ex­
perimentation with willing sources and materials.49 
This argument is not without faults. The idea that scientists should 
be free to gather information from materials under their control is 
question begging. In the context of animal experimentation the 
precise issue is whether scientists have the right to "control" objects 
of their research in the way that they do.50 For example, if one 
claims a right to conduct experiments with a virus in one's posses­
sion and control, the right to perform such experiments depends on 
whether one has the legal right to use the virus in the way called for 
in the experiment. If use of the virus in question is legally prohib­
ited, mere possession of it does not permit use of it in the manner 
called for by any experiment. In the same way, the real question 
here is whether the animal experimenter has a right to use an 
animal in the way required for a painful animal experiment. 
Moreover, the so called right to receive information appears 
from the case law to be primarily focused on the right to hear 
others publicly speak and to obtain information from them.51 This 
49. Id. at 1223-24; see also Robertson, supra note 19, at 504 & n.120. 
50. Francione, supra note 5, at 447 & n.109. 
51. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
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right to receive information may, then, be restricted to obtaining 
access to the courts and to obtaining information from others in a 
public context. In other words, the right of the press to obtain in­
formation is connected to the political purposes behind the First 
Amendment. Indeed, Spece and Weinzierl adopted Francione's 
statement that the necessary prerequisite argument is generally sub­
ject to the criticism that the courts have only protected prerequi­
sites to speech in the area of political speech.52 The right of the 
press to obtain information may only be for the purpose of foster­
ing and protecting democratic values and, in the commercial con­
text, economic values.53 The ability to obtain information by the 
private manipulation of "objects" is outside of these spheres. Thus, 
authorities that apply to news-gathering may not apply wholesale to 
scientific experimentation. 
Further, examining more closely the supposed special rights of 
those involved in news-gathering reveals that there are no such spe­
cial rights. The rights of access given to the press are not extraordi­
nary rights but are the same ones given to the public. This is made 
clear in Branzburg v. Hayes,54 where the Supreme Court deter­
mined that the press did not have a constitutional privilege to re­
fuse to testify before a grand jury about confidential sources of 
information: 
It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate 
every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the 
enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general 
applicability.... 
It has generally been held that the First Amendment does 
not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to 
information not available to the public generally .... 
. . . We are asked to create another [privilege] by interpret­
ing the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privi­
748, 757 (1976) (discussing the right to receive information in a commercial context); 
see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-64 (1972) (discussing the right to receive 
information in the context of admission of a Marxist alien who American professors 
wished to hear in the United States); Robertson, supra note 14, at 1221-23 (discussing 
this case law). 
52. Spece, Jf. & Weinzierl, supra note 13, at 209 (citing Francione, supra note 5 at 
462-63. 
53. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right of 
the press to obtain information. 
54. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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lege that other citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to do.... 
On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for holding 
that the public interest jn law enforcement and in ensuring effec­
tive grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the conse­
quential, but uncertain, burden on news-gathering that is said to 
result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to 
relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury 
investigation or criminal trial.55 
Thus, there is no special right in the press to access to information. 
The right of the press to information is precisely the same as that of 
any other citizen. As a result, those engaged in scientific experi­
mentation cannot claim a special right to receive information by 
analogizing to such rights of the press. The best that can be ob­
tained by this argument by analogy is a right coextensive with the 
right of any member of the public. However, animal experimenters 
seek rights unburdened by the animal cruelty statutes that common 
citizens are subject to, and to be free from regulation of the kind 
posited by the hypothetical statute. Consequently, rights coexten­
sive with the public do not provide sufficient protection for 
experimenters. 
The necessary prerequisite argument fails for several reasons. 
First, the Supreme Court has never clearly stated that prerequisites 
to speech are protected. Second, case law cited for the necessary 
prerequisite argument, such as Buckley v. Valeo,56 does not neces­
sarily support the argument,57 as this case law may be focused on 
pure political speech, not prerequisites to speech. Third, the news­
gathering analogy does not yield any special protection for experi­
menters; it yields only the same protection provided for the general 
public.58 For these reasons, the necessary prerequisite argument 
cannot be maintained based on existing authorities. 
B. Restrictions on Conduct and the First Amendment 
Since the hypothetical prohibition on painful animal experi­
mentation is a restriction on conduct, it is worthwhile to pause here 
and consider restrictions on conduct and their relation to con­
55. Id. at 682-91 (citations omitted); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 
(1974) (noting that the Constitution does not provide any special access to information 
to the press that is not shared by the public). 
56. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
57. See supra notes 29-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of flaws in the 
necessary prerequisite argument. 
58. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690-91. 
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straints on speech. Every restriction on conduct is a restriction on 
speech. If, for example, I am restrained by the laws of trespass 
from walking on my neighbor's property, I am similarly restrained 
from communicating to others about the experience of doing SO.59 
The question, then, becomes what restrictions on conduct are per­
mitted under the First Amendment. Surely, for instance, it is not 
possible to generally restrict the conduct of writing-this would run 
afoul of the First Amendment as a direct prior restraint on pure 
speech unjustified by any perceived policy. The task now is to iden­
tify types of conduct restrictions that can be imposed consistent 
with the First Amendment. In analyzing this issue, this Article will 
consider cases dealing not only with conduct, but also with pure 
speech. If a restriction on pure speech is permitted, then presuma­
bly a restriction on conduct related to that speech is permitted in 
the same circumstances. 
Restrictions on conduct that promote public health, safety, and 
morals do not implicate First Amendment concerns. An obvious 
case is the ability to restrain dangerous speech and conduct, such as 
yelling "fire" in a crowded theater.6o There are, of course, much 
more subtle restrictions on conduct that can impact speech and yet 
are justified by public health, safety, and moral concerns. For ex­
ample, commercial speech may be restricted so that it is truthful 
and not misleading.61 Access to prisons may be restricted to pro­
tect prisoner morale and discipline even though this has an impact 
on speech concerning prison conditions.62 Preventing political cor­
ruption is a proper basis for restricting speech and speech-related 
conduct.63 The distribution of obscene material may be restricted 
to protect public morals.64 Thus, diverse restrictions on conduct 
59. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (stating that one may appropriately 
be excluded from access to the White House even though such a restriction limits the 
amount of information one may gather and communicate to others). 
60. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,52 (1919) (noting that free speech pro­
tections do not extend to speech that is "of such a nature as to create a clear and pre­
sent danger"). 
61. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (noting that advertising by law­
yers may be regulated to insure that it is not misleading); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (noting that a state 
may regulate commercial speech in regards to misleading or deceptive language). 
62. See Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849 (1974) (holding that the First 
Amendment was not violated by a prison regulation limiting press access). 
63. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam). 
64. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942» (noting that obscene material may be regulated to 
protect "the social interest in order and morality"). Roth also approved jury instruc­
tions defining obscenity in terms of "immorality." Id. at 486, 489. 
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and speech itself are justified by policies protecting public health, 
safety, and morals. 
Policies that seek to ensure the proper functioning of the judi­
cial system may also warrant regulations of speech. As has been 
discussed, journalists may be compelled to testify about information 
obtained from confidential sources, even though this will have an 
impact on the reporting of news and the ability to obtain informa­
tion from sources desirous of confidentiality.65 Other restrictions 
on speech have also been justified by concerns about protection of 
the judicial system.66 
National security is also a basis for restrictions on conduct hav­
ing an impact on speech. Zemel v. Rusk67 held that the Secretary of 
State can refuse to validate a passport for travel to Cuba, even 
though this restricts the ability of a citizen to gather information to 
become a better informed citizen.68 This restriction, in the name of 
national security, was viewed not as a direct restraint on speech, but 
only as a curb on action.69 Similarly, the federal government may 
deny aliens who advocate worldwide communism entry into the 
United States, even though this may limit the ability of citizens to 
hear this type of speech.70 Even direct prior restraints on speech 
may be permitted to protect national security. For instance, an in­
junction prohibiting publication of information pertaining to crea­
tion of atomic weapons has been determined not to violate the First 
Amendment.71 Educational goals may also justify restraints on 
conduct and speech itself. For example, school officials may exer­
cise editorial control over student publications without offending 
the First Amendment.72 In order to promote a suitable educational 
environment it is permissible to place greater restrictions on the 
65. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972). 
66. See In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (4th Cir. 1984) (determining that an 
order prohibiting prospective witnesses from speaking to the press is necessary to as­
sure a fair trial and is not a violation of the First Amendment); Belo Broad. Corp. v. 
Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981) (noting that the press does not 
have a constitutional right of physical access to trial exhibits). But see Valley Broad. 
Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 798 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that there 
is a presumption in favor of granting access to trial information). 
67. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 
68. Id. at 3-4. 
69. Id. at 16. 
70. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756, 769-70 (1972). 
71. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Wis. 1979) 
(preliminary injunction). . 
72. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,273 (1988). 
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speech of students than are placed on adults.73 It is appropriate to 
prohibit speech that is vulgar or otherwise inappropriate provided 
that such restrictions are related to legitimate pedagogical goals.74 
Potential psychological harm to youngsters has been declared a 
valid ground for restricting a student survey concerning sexual is­
sues.75 In the educational setting, then, many types of restrictions 
on conduct and speech have been found to be consistent with the 
First Amendment. 
Sometimes, free speech interests conflict with the rights of 
others. In such cases, free speech interests may yield to conflicting 
rights. The exercise of one's free speech rights does not, for exam­
ple, permit one to invade the rights of others or to violate the law to 
acquire information.76 Thus, journalists are not exempt on First 
Amendment grounds from liability for the invasion of the privacy 
of others.77 
Restrictions are also placed on the use of property relevant to 
free speech. The classic case revealing this principle is Buckley v. 
Valeo,78 which allowed restrictions on spending money on political 
parties even though this money was to be used to advertise and 
promote political candidates-a fundamental purpose of free 
speech.79 In fact, the spending restriction in that case was not just 
an incidental restriction on the use of property; it can be seen as a 
direct restriction on speech since the contribution of money to a 
political party is itself speech.8o Prevention of corruption is the pol­
icy foundation for allowing such a restriction on the use of property 
and exercise of free speech.81 This policy fits within the above de­
scribed categories of protection of public morals and prevention of 
impingement on the rights of others. 
Permissible restrictions on speech and speech-related conduct 
may vary based on the type of media and the type of speech in­
volved.82 For example, the broadcast media is subject to greater 
73. See id. at 266. 
74. Id. at 271-73. 
75. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir. 1977). 
76. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) (noting that the 
First Amendment does not give the press immunity from torts or crimes committed 
during investigation). 
77. See id. 
78. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
79. /d. at 18-21 (per curiam). 
80. [d. at 19 (per curiam). 
81. See id. at 25 (per curiam). 
82. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (noting that the medium of 
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regulation than the print media,83 the latter being the type of media 
that is typically used in dissemination of scientific information. Fur­
thermore, commercial speech is subject to greater restrictions than 
are political, artistic, and scientific speech.84 
Return to the hypothetical statute prohibiting painful animal 
experimentation. This law would not be passed for the purpose of 
restricting speech. Rather, it would further other interests like: 
protecting animals from pain and suffering, preventing the harden­
ing of humans to the suffering of others, and fulfilling what we be­
lieve to be our moral obligations to other creatures. Do these 
policies fit within the policies that have historically been found to 
be appropriate foundations for regulating conduct with incidental 
impacts on speech? 
The following justifications for restrictions on conduct have 
passed First Amendment scrutiny: public health, safety, and morals; 
protection of the integrity of the judicial system; national security; 
educational goals; and protection of the conflicting rights of 
others.85 The hypothesized prohibition on painful animal experi­
mentation fits within several of these justifications. First, it is an 
expression of public morals about the conduct involved. In this re­
. spect, it is analogous to restrictions on the distribution of obscene 
; materials. Second, it is an attempt to protect animals from pain and 
suffering, similar to cases restricting conduct relating to speech to 
protect the rights and interests of humans. In fact, the policy justifi­
cations for the hypothetical statute are much the same as those be­
hind state animal cruelty laws.86 These statutes have been 
characterized by some courts as protecting pre-existing "rights" 
expression is a factor in First Amendment analysis); JONATHAN w. EMORD, FREEDOM, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 278-81 (1991) (discussing the approach of 
treating different media differently under the First Amendment); Lisman, supra note 
13, at 7 (stating that political, artistic, and intellectual speech is accorded greater protec­
tion than is commercial speech). 
83. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748 (noting that "of all forms of communication, 
it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection"). 
84. See Lisman, supra note 13, at 7; cf. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,762 (1976) (noting the lower standard of First 
Amendment protection for commercial speech). 
85. These categories appear, in fact, to be largely coextensive with what is gener­
ally considered to be the scope of the legislative power. Cf THEODORE SEDGWICK, 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 24-27 (2d ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1980) (1857) 
(describing the scope of public and private legislation). 
86. GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY AND THE LAW 123 (1995) (noting 
the dual purpose of anti-cruelty laws: protection of animals and conservation of public 
morals). 
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held by animals.87 Thus, there is at least some legal authority for 
the proposition that animals do have rights and interests that are 
subject to legal protection, and these rights can be used to offset 
any claimed First Amendment rights of researchers. Apart from 
legal authority regarding rights or interests existing in animals, 
there is voluminous philosophical and legal literature propounding 
theories of rights for animals.88 Note also that since restrictions on 
speech-related conduct may restrict the use of property, it is not 
beyond the scope of these policy justifications to affect the use of 
animals as property. Therefore, the restrictions on conduct envi­
sioned by the hypothetical statute are justified by policies that have 
historically been found sufficient for other restrictions on speech­
related conduct. 
One might nonetheless respond to these arguments by saying 
that the policies outlined in the cases described above do not really 
justify the restriction on conduct involved here. First, one could 
claim that regulations based on moral principles are either not the 
proper subjects of law in any case or are not really the basis for 
cases like the obscenity cases. The former issue is a monumental 
one beyond the scope of this Article.89 The latter argument might 
explain the obscenity cases as protecting human health and safety, 
but not morals. For example, one might say that regulation of the 
distribution· of obscene material is for the purpose of insuring the 
safety of people who might be in the area of businesses dealing in 
such material. However, the difficulty with this argument is that 
these grounds were not stated in the Supreme Court's seminal ob­
scenity cases, although moral concerns were noted.90 
87. Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456, 458 (1881) (interpreting an anti-cruelty statute as 
recognizing "some abstract rights" in animals); Hunt v. State, 29 N.E. 933, 933 (Ind. 
App. 1892); see also FRANCIONE, supra note 86, at 122-23, 297 nn.37-38 (discussing the 
recognition of "animal rights"). 
88. See generally TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983); PETER 
SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975); Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status 
for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531 (1998). 
89. See generally ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES 
AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 400-29 
(1986); Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY (Stuart 
Hampshire ed., 1978), reprinted in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 60, 63-65 (Michael J. 
Sandel ed., 1984); Gerald Dworkin, Devlin Was Right: Law and the Enforcement of 
Morality, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 927 (1999); Kent Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of 
Morality, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRlMINOLOGY 710 (1995); S. I. Strong, Romer v. Evans and 
the Permissibility of Morality Legislation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1259 (1997); Calvin Wood­
ard, Thoughts on the Interplay Between Morality and Law in Modern Legal Thought, 64 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 784 (1989). 
90. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. 
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Second, one can argue that cases allowing regulation of speech­
related conduct based on protecting the rights of others only allow 
for the protection of human rights and interests, not those of ani­
mals. While this is generally true, it is not unjustified to assume 
that the same treatment can be accorded to animals if, as I have 
assumed in the hypothetical, Congress has made a determination 
that animals do have interests worth protecting. Moreover, some 
present laws concerning cruelty to animals have as one of their pur­
ported bases the protection of the interests of animals.91 Thus, 
animal interests have been recognized. In any event, the hypotheti­
cal statute is also based on furthering the interest of preventing 
human exposure to cruelty against animals so that such cruelty is 
not translated into acts against humans. 
It is important to note that the purpose behind adopting the 
statute is not the restriction of speech itself, since a regulation 
aimed at restricting speech is subject to greater scrutiny than is a 
restriction aimed at non-speech activities.92 Regulations aimed at 
restraining speech itself warrant a strict scrutiny standard.93 By 
contrast, courts apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to regulation 
of conduct that contains both speech and conduct elements.94 
Where the regulation does not intend to restrict speech at all, the 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942» (noting the importance of "the social inter­
est in order and morality" in obscenity cases). 
91. See FRANCIONE, supra note 86, at 122-23 (noting that some anti-cruelty stat­
utes are intended to protect animals themselves). 
92. See U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (noting the lower standard 
applied to a combination of "speech" and "non speech" elements). 
93. See Favre & McKinnon, supra note 12, at 684-85 (noting that pure speech 
may be regulated if there is a clear and present danger from the speech or it is defama­
tory or obscene); Spece, Jr. & Weinzierl, supra note 13, at 219 ("[Clompelling state 
interest scrutiny is usually applied to content-based regulations of speech ...."); David­
son, Note, supra note 12, at 914-15 (stating that present danger of imminent lawlessness 
is necessary in order to regulate pure speech); cf Delgado et aI., supra note 14, at 194 
(noting that the burden shifts to the proponent of regulations on research to show the 
likelihood of substantial harm); Robertson, supra note 14, at 1210, 1248-49 (noting that 
regulation of constitutional rights triggers heightened scrutiny and that suppression of 
the expression of knowledge implicates the First Amendment). 
94. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77 (stating that a "sufficiently important govern­
mental interest" may justify regulations on conduct incorporating both "speech" and 
"non speech" elements); Delgado et aI., supra note 14, at 166 (noting the lower stan­
dard of review for activities combining speech and non-speech elements); Favre & Mc­
Kinnon, supra note 12, at 692 (setting forth the less stringent test for "indirect 
restraints" on speech); Ferguson, supra note 19, at 655-56 (indicating that heightened 
scrutiny applies when communication is necessary to the conduct); Robertson, supra 
note 14, at 1254-57 (noting the lower level of scrutiny applied in O'Brien, a case dealing 
with conduct incorporating speech and non-speech elements); Spece, Jr. & Weinzierl, 
supra note 13, at 219 (suggesting that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard 
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First Amendment is not implicated.95 Our hypothetical case falls in 
the latter category, where no restriction is intended to be placed on 
speech. If this is a proper characterization of the hypothetical stat­
ute, the First Amendment is not at all implicated in a prohibition on 
animal experimentation and cannot be a basis for overturning such 
a law. Nonetheless, I will assume for the sake of argument that 
First Amendment concerns are relevant to the hypothetical statute. 
As noted above, regulation of conduct not intended to restrict • 
speech does not implicate the First Amendment. Conduct that is 
related to speech can, even if such intent exists, be regulated based 
on the policies previously described. Therefore, one arguing the in­
validity of the hypothetical statute must present a novel and strong 
argument to support a claim that the statute somehow violates the 
First Amendment. If the press and the public, in pursuit of political 
speech goals such as news-gathering and promotion of political par­
ties, have their conduct restrained consistent with the First Amend­
ment, those claiming protection of animal experiments must lay 
claim to some superior place in the constitutional hierarchy to over­
turn a legislative judgment against such experiments. They must 
claim special importance in scientific research that justifies invali­
dating legislation similar to that the general public must obey­
animal cruelty laws. The scientist, then, must claim that his or her 
activity is deserving of special protection although a non-scientist's 
similar conduct is not. 
To show that this is necessarily the case, suppose that I, a non­
scientist, decided to undertake a scientific experiment examining 
the effect of placing a certain caustic liquid on the skin of cats. One 
hundred cats are to be used in this experiment that has not been 
previously performed. This experiment is undertaken on my prop­
erty under accepted scientific methods, and the results will be pub­
lished on the Internet and through a publisher. The experiment will 
cause substantial pain and suffering to the cats. If local animal wel­
fare officials were informed of my intentions, they would undoubt­
edly determine these plans to be illegal and a violation of animal 
for regulation of experimentation); Davidson, Note, supra note 12, at 915 (noting the 
heightened scrutiny applied to restrictions on "pure speech"). 
95. Cf. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (noting that conduct combining "speech" and 
"non speech" elements may be regulated even if that limits one's First Amendment 
freedoms); Robertson, supra note 14, at 1215 (noting that the First Amendment's pri­
mary concern is protecting expression); Davidson, Note, supra note 12, at 913 (noting 
that the government's ability to regulate "expression" is limited). 
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welfare laws.96 
I am equally confident that my conduct in carrying out the 
above experiment, a necessary prerequisite to speech, would not be 
protected by the First Amendment. If this were not the case, 
animal cruelty laws (not to mention any other regulation of con­
duct) would be invalid in any case where I intended to engage in 
speech relating to my otherwise illegal conduct. The prohibition on 
my conduct and the resulting restriction on my freedom of speech 
would be justified by the policies of promoting public morals and 
the interests of animals described earlier.97 
The situation of an animal experimenter faced with the hypo­
thetical statute is precisely the same as the non-scientist's situation 
in relation to animal cruelty laws. The experiment is prohibited by 
law. Nonetheless, it is claimed that the First Amendment protects 
the activity of the scientist in a circumstance where a non-scientist is 
not protected. There can be only one way to maintain such an ar­
gument-to argue that there is something unique and special about 
scientists that affords them unprecedented First Amendment rights. 
Is it, then, of First Amendment significance to be a scientist? 




A. Historical Arguments 
Numerous arguments have been made in an attempt to justify 
a special place in First Amendment theory for science. Among 
these arguments is one based on the history of the Constitution and 
the First Amendment. Neither the text of the First Amendment 
nor the text of the Constitution reveal a special place for science.98 
Nonetheless, science is said to have occupied a special place for the 
Founding Fathers.99 There was great respect for science and inter­
96. I consider this point incontrovertible and suggest that anyone wishing to dis­
pute it contact animal welfare agencies to see their response to the described experi­
ment. Animal cruelty laws, either explicitly or through judicial construction, do not 
generally apply to experimentation conducted by "scientists." FRANCIONE, supra note 
86, at 134, 139-42; see also Favre, supra note 3, at 124 (noting that the actions taken by 
animal experimenters would probably violate cruelty laws under different 
circumstances). 
97. See supra pp. 617-18 for a discussion of the recognition of animal interests 
and morality in restrictions on cruelty to animals. 
98. u.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states, in relevant part, "Con­
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...." Id. 
99. Favre & McKinnon, supra note 12, at 712-19 (discussing specific founding fa­
thers and their involvement with science). 
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est in scientific issues during the eighteenth century when the Con­
stitution and its earliest amendments were drafted.1°O Ben 
Franklin, a famous scientist in his own right, was intimately in­
volved in the constitutional process. But the veneration of science 
by the Founding Fathers went deeper than just personal interests 
and talents. The Framers of the Constitution were followers of En­
lightenment thought,101 and the Framers believed in and respected 
the fundamental tenets of scientific theory, the verification theory, 
and correction of theory through experimentation.102 Scientific 
method blossomed along with ideas of freedom of expression, and 
thus, the framers were enthusiastic about science and its 
implications.103 
This interest in, and appreciation of, science was part of the 
reason for the religious Establishment Clause to the Constitu­
tion.104 This clause was meant, among other things, to protect sci­
ence from suppression by established religion.105 From this we can 
surmise that free speech was not meant to be limited to only politi­
cal speech, but was meant to extend to scientific speech as well. 106 
Although today there is still controversy surrounding the teaching 
of evolution, cases concerning evolution strengthen the view that 
science should not suffer based upon religious strictures.107 More­
over, the import of science becomes apparent when we see that the 
Establishment Clause has been ineffective in challenges to laws 
prohibiting homosexuality, but has been useful in protecting scien­
tific activity. lOB In other words, we allow religious ideas to dictate 
law in the area of what is perceived as moral issues, but we do not 
allow religion to penetrate scientific doctrine.109 In addition, 
100. Steven Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of American Science, 1979 U. 
ILL. 	L.F. 1, 2-3 (1979). 
10l. Favre & McKinnon, supra note 12, at 712. 
102. Id. at 712-19. 
103. Francione, supra note 5, at 428. 
104. Goldberg, supra note 100, at 4-5. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 6-7 ("The notion that free speech applied to science was ... 
inevitable. "). 
107. Id. at 7-10 (discussing the leading case of Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 
(1968»; see also Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 490 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating that teach­
ing does not need to "be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect 
or dogma"); Moore v. Gaston County Ed. of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037, 1042-44 
(W.D.N.C. 1973) (holding it is unconstitutional to fire a teacher for discussing the 
Evolution theory with students, unless the teacher was ordered to not discuss this 
topic). 
108. Goldberg, supra note 100, at 1O-1l. 
109. Id. 
489 2001] ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION 
through Constitutional provisions on patents, the military, and 
weights and measures, the government has supplied substantial 
funding for science.11o Based on the foregoing, Steven Goldberg 
has proposed that the Constitution should be regarded as having an 
implied clause concerning the promotion of science.l11 
Not all commentators are convinced by such arguments. For 
example, . Stephen L. Carter notes that even though the Framers 
may have thought science to be of considerable import, this does 
not mean that they intended that the First Amendment provide 
protection for scientific activity.112 Spece and Weinzierl summarize 
many of the critiques of the theories that find science to be a pre­
ferred type of speech subject to special protection.113 Moreover, 
they point out one weakness of the argument that scientific activity 
is protected speech: even if there were special protection for scien­
tific activity, such protection would necessitate that we define what 
science is and what is appropriate experimentation.114 Such a defi­
nition would favor those who practice science in accepted ways, 
thereby shrinking the scope and usefulness of science.Hs 
One may successfully challenge the notion that historically 
there is a special place for science in the Constitution and the First 
Amendment. It can hardly be denied that the primary function of 
the First Amendment is to protect political speech.116 This spotlight 
on political speech was energized by the Framers' concerns about 
laws prohibiting seditious libel.117 The primary focus of free speech 
is thus to allow the free interchange of ideas on political and social 
issues.118 
The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such 
political expression in order "to assure [the] unfettered in­
terchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
110. Id. at 16-22 (discussing the constitutional authority for, and the spending in, 
these areas). 
111. Id. at 16. 
112. Carter, supra note 2, at 369-73. 
113. Spece, Jr. & Weinzierl, supra note 13, at 201-13 (discussing Professor Gary 
L. Francione and Professor Stephen L. Carter among others). 
114. Id. at 209 (noting Professor Francione's critique that scientific speech would 
have to be limited or "virtually all activity could be brought within it"). 
115. See Francione, supra note 5, at 500. 
116. EMORD, supra note 82, at 19-20; Bork, supra note 27, at 29 (asserting that 
the "core" of the First Amendment is political speech). 
117. See EMORD, supra note 82, at 53-62 (discussing cases involving claims of 
seditious libel). 
118. See George Anastaplo, Human Nature and the First Amendment, 40 U. PrIT. 
L. REV. 661, 683-84 (1979). 
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changes desired by the people." Although First Amendment 
protections are not confined to "the exposition of ideas, there is 
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental 
affairs.... of course includ[ing] discussions of candidates ...." 
This no more than reflects our "profound national commitment 
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhib­
ited, robust, and wide-open [sic]." In a republic where the people 
are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed 
choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities 
of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we 
follow as a nation. As the Court observed in Monitor Patriot Co. 
v. Roy, ... "it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guar­
antee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the 
conduct of campaigns for political office."119 
The Journals of the Continental Congress also evidences that 
freedom of the press has its principal purpose in safeguarding 
against political oppression. 
The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the 
press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement 
of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of 
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its 
ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its con­
sequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive 
officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and 
just modes of conducting affairs.120 
Although science was surely of significance to the Framers, it is 
undoubtedly true that they were interested in other types of expres­
sion. Among the Framers were a number of essayists, writers, and 
people interested in the arts. William Livingston was a poet and an 
essayist.121 Ben Franklin wrote songs and essays.122 William Leigh 
Pierce created literary sketches of his colleagues at the Constitu­
tional Convention.123 Thomas Jefferson, a voracious reader, was in­
119. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam) (alterations in origi­
nal) (citations omitted). 
120. 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 108 (Worthing­
ton Chauncey Ford ed., 1904). 
121. M.E. BRADFORD, FOUNDING FATHERS 54 (2d ed. rev., Univ. Press of Kan. 
1994) (1981). 
122. 1 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: A BIOGRAPHY IN HIS OWN WORDS 69-71, 76 
(Thomas Fleming ed., 1972) (providing examples of songs Franklin wrote). 
123. BRADFORD, supra note 121, at 208. 
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terested in many subjects, including art and architecture.124 
Jefferson stated that the only thing for which he envied Europeans 
was their art. 125 Thus, just because the Framers were children of 
the Enlightenment does not mean that they held science in a pecu­
liar and special regard. Rather, the Founding Fathers had many in­
terests, all of which may have contributed to their thoughts on 
freedom of speech. 
Indeed, as recognized today, speech has many aspects and 
means of expression-political, literary, and artistic: 
Freedom of speech may allow the expression of powerful emo­
tions and provide an outlet for the creative impulse in a variety of 
forms, including literature, drama, and the visual arts. Listeners 
or audiences may also be enriched by exposure to emotive or 
artistic expression. ... Although some of the benefits of emotive 
or aesthetic expression might be realized by a solitary writer 
making an entry in a private diary, the self-realization value of 
free speech would surely be injured if the government were to 
forbid plays to be performed or pictures exhibited.126 
Some argue that the Founding Fathers had great interest in sci­
ence, and thus, science held a special place in their view of freedom 
of speech. This argument ignores the fact that the science of the 
eighteenth century is truly incommensurable with modern science. 
Therefore, to suggest that the Founding Fathers' favorable views of 
eighteenth century science would carry over to the science of today 
is an extrapolation we cannot make. While electricity was mysteri­
ous at that time, today science has taken us to a world where the 
possibility of push-button Armageddon is real, and genetic research 
may allow the creation of many new species. The tattered yellowed 
pages describing Franklin's string and kite are now supplanted by 
computer bytes containing descriptions of space weapons, animal 
tortures, and the creation of new forms of life. It is dubious that 
enthusiasm about 18th century science translates into exuberance 
about the present direction and accomplishments of science. 
B. Arguments Based on the Nature of Science 
Arguments that posit a special place for science under the First 
124. DOUGLAS T. MILLER, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE CREATION OF 
AMERICA 82-93 (1997). 
125. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Bellini (Sept. 30, 1785), in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 832, 834 (1984). 
126. Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the 
First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 54, 80 (1989). 
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Amendment rely on a particular view of the nature of science. Sci­
ence is described as the talisman of truth, the means of finding the 
empirical Holy Grail. Many writers on this subject seem to accept a 
justificationist cumulative view of science-science is the means, 
through the use of the scientific method, for finding the "truth."127 
Those who propound such views may be seen as revealing a kind of 
arrogance that belittles the ability of the public to understand the 
nature of science.128 This view of science has been replaced for the 
most part by a view that recognizes that science itself is a sociologi­
cal and political process. 
Before discussing the justificationist cumulative view of sci­
ence, it is important to realize that even if science w~re synonymous 
with "truth," this would not entitle science to special First Amend­
ment treatment. There is no general protection for true, as opposed 
to false, speech.129 It is not just "true" speech that the First 
Amendment protects.130 The First Amendment protects speech re­
gardless of its value.131 Further, if "true" speech were specially 
protected one must shudder in considering how we would distin­
guish true from false speech. Would book burnings be far behind? 
Thus, the supposed "truth" of particular speech cannot be a ground 
for its special protection. 
Even if "truth" were a valid reason for special protection of 
particular speech, current views of science do not support the view 
127. See Lisman, supra note 13, at 4-5 (noting that science advances the goal of 
discovering truth); see also Favre, supra note 3, at 130 (describing science as a "truth 
seeking" activity); Davidson, Note, supra note 12, at 905-06 (noting that research is a 
search for truth); cf. Favre & McKinnon, supra note 12, at 654-62 (explaining science as 
a cumulative process where, through accumulation of knowledge, we gradually step 
ever higher toward the truth). 
128. Ct. Paul Carlson, Real Science, UNIFICATION NEWS, Feb. 1996, at http:// 
www.tparents.orglUnification/UnificationNews/Feb.1996/ReaIScience.htm (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2001) (on file with Western New England Law Review). In this article, ignorant 
politicians are blamed for not seeing the value of atom smashers and the study of slime 
molds. Id. 'll 18. Presumably, comedian Chris Rock's routine noting that with all the 
money spent on science no disease has been cured since polio would fit into this public 
ignorance, as would his sociological explanation that AIDS will not be cured because it 
is presently too profitable for drug companies to allow discovery of a cure. 
129. Cf. Francione, supra note 5, at 483-84 (arguing that protecting only "true" 
scientific speech is problematic). But see Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (noting a State's authority to regu­
late "deceptive" speech in the commercial context). 
130. Cf. Francione, supra note 5, at 484 (discussing John Stuart Mill's view that it 
is not just true speech that should be protected). 
131. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("Th[e] right to receive 
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth is fundamental to our free soci­
ety.") (citation omitted). 
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of science as "truth." Thomas Kuhn's groundbreaking study of sci­
ence, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,132 is largely responsi­
ble for modern thought about the nature of science. Kuhn 
challenges the traditional view of science as a piecemeal process of 
accumulation of facts and data over time.133 In reality, science is a 
very human process in which results are affected by innumerable 
individual human choices about which hypotheses to test and which 
experiments to perform.134 There are arbitrary elements based on 
personal choices and historical accident built into the progress of 
science.135 Science proceeds under a system of received beliefs that 
are propounded by the scientific educational community, which de­
termines, among other things, the proper questions to ask and 
which experiments to perform.136 In its normal operation, which 
Kuhn refers to as "normal science," science is the mechanism by 
which nature is fit into conceptual boxes established by received 
scientific beliefs as expounded in the scientific academy.137 
Kuhn originally called these boxes "paradigms."138 Due to 
problems with the concept of "paradigm," Kuhn changed his para­
digm concept to what he called "disciplinary matrices."139 These 
disciplinary matrices include symbolic generalizations of science, 
such as the equations of physics, and metaphysical concepts of sci­
ence, such as "heat is kinetic energy."140 Disciplinary matrices also 
have evaluative aspects including the need for replicable accurate 
results, and self consistency.141 Nonetheless, since the main text of 
Kuhn's work uses the "paradigm" terminology, I will use the para­
digm vocabulary to mean "disciplinary matrices." 
After a scientific community accepts a particular paradigm, the 
community operates in the box-filling fashion that Kuhn referred to 
132. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUcruRE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 
1970). 
133. See KUHN, supra note 132, at 1-2; Francione, supra note 5, at 493 (discussing 
the profound impact on science of Professor Kuhn's book). 
134. See Kuhn, supra note 132, at 4. 
135. Id. 
136. See id. at 4-5. 
137. See id. at 5. 
138. See id. at 10-11. Paradigms have two characteristics: they are concrete scien­
tific achievements sufficiently unprecedented to obtain a group of adherents and are 
sufficiently open ended to provide problems for scientists to work on in the normal 
"box filling" fashion. Id. at 10. Paradigms are concepts and rules shared by a particular 
scientific community. Id. at 11, 182. 
139. /d. at 182. 
140. Id. at 182-84. 
141. Id. at 184-85. 
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as "normal science."142 Normal science is "mopping up" work in­
volving fitting more and more phenomena into the boxes created by 
the paradigm.l43 The paradigm thus provides .the necessary frame­
work for this scientific activity. 
In the course of normal science, results that do not fit into the 
paradigm are ignored; they are seen as failures of the scientist until 
some new paradigm arises to explain the anomalous result.144 The 
only problems admitted to be legitimate are those presented by the 
paradigm,145 which dictates the nature of proper solutions to 
problems and the steps to follow to solve these questions.146 Thus, 
the paradigm of a particular area of science provides the rules of 
the game that must be followed in doing "science. "147 
According to Kuhn, however, science does not always operate 
in this normal fashion; anomalies and novelties are from time to 
time encountered that do not fit into existing conceptual boxes.148 
While scientists may attempt to suppress these anomalies, this sup­
pression cannot be successfully maintained for long. Ultimately, 
there is an accumulation of anomalous outcomes resulting in a 
breakdown of the normal puzzle-solving activity of science.149 
These anomalies may result in the creation of a number of compet­
ing theories to explain the emerging, troubling, empirical informa­
tion.150 One thing that does not occur as a result of encountering 
scientific anomalies is the jettison of an existing paradigm.151 
Rather, the existing paradigm is modified to deal with unexpected 
results; there will be a paradigm change only when there is general 
acceptance of a new paradigm.l52 Indeed, the rejection of a para­
digm without acceptance of a new one is the rejection of science ­
142. /d. at 24. 
143. Id. In more detail, the activity of normal science can be divided into three 
sorts of endeavors. First is the establishing of facts that the paradigm has shown to be 
particularly revealing, like boiling points of chemicals in chemistry. Id. at 25. A second 
enterprise is gathering of facts to compare with results predicted by the paradigm. Id. 
at 26. A third project is empirical work to further articulate the paradigm itself, that is, 
the search for universal constants and the like under the paradigm that can be applied 
to new phenomena. Id. at 27-28. 
144. /d. at 35. 
145. See id. at 37. 
146. Id. at 38. 
147. Id. at 40-41. 
148. See id. at 5 (questioning the usefulness of the conceptual boxes). 
149. Id. at 52. 
150. See id. at 70-72 (describing examples of how different scientists approach the 
same scientific anomaly in different ways). 
151. Id. at 77. 
152. /d. at 77-78. 
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without a paradigm there are no generalizations and no rules under 
which science may operate. IS3 
The effect of crisis caused by anomalies is a blurring of the 
existing paradigm and the loosening of the rules of normal sci­
ence.IS4 In this context of crisis, various schools of thought develop, 
pitted against each other on the issues presented by existing scien­
tific results. ISS These groups will propose different paradigms to 
solve the problems created by anomalies.IS6 The various paradigms 
proposed will, however, be incommensurable; thus, in arguments 
between proponents of different paradigms, the groups will "talk 
through" each other.1S7 This occurs since proponents of differing 
paradigms will look at different problems, use disparate vocabulary, 
rely on distinctive instruments, and view results in varying ways.ISS 
In short, their differing perspectives will provide each group with a 
unique world view.Is9 Ultimately there is a "revolution"160 in which 
the existing paradigm in an area of science is replaced by a new 
paradigm-a new set of "boxes" into which nature is placed.16I 
This revolution results from the realization that present scientific 
institutions and theories do not adequately explain the results being 
obtained.162 
The changing of paradigms is generally met with considerable 
resistance by the scientific community and often requires the dying 
off of proponents of the existing paradigm.163 Paradigm change, 
however, does not come about as a result of verification or proof; 
instead, Kuhn refers to the taking on of a new paradigm as a "con­
version. "164 It is like a gestalt shift in perception-the scientist sud­
denly sees the world differently-there are new objects, in new 
153. Id. at 79. 
154. Id. at 84. 
155. See id. at 93-94 (discussing the similarity between political and scientific de­
velopment and the way parties with differing views interact). 
156. See id. Kuhn notes that sometimes an intense crisis is not required because 
new paradigms are proposed before a crisis becomes intense. Id. at 86-87. 
157. Id. at 148-50. 
158. Id. at 148-49. 
159. See id. at 150 ("The proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades 
in different worlds."). 
160. Note that crises and paradigm changes in science generally occur within par­
ticular disciplines of science, not to science in general. For example, a paradigm change 
in biology may have no impact on the paradigms of physics and vice versa. See id. at 49­
50, 179-80. 
161. See id. at 5-6. 
162. Id. at 92. 
163. Id. at 151-52. 
164. Id. at 150-52. 
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positions, with new characteristics.165 A change in paradigm is like 
the "duck-rabbit" of Ludwig Wittgenstein-the change of paradigm 
is like the shift from viewing the figure as a duck to viewing it as a 
rabbit.166 A new paradigm is a new way of seeing the world. 
To Kuhn, the progress of scientific knowledge through history 
is not just a cumulation of knowledge arrived at through application 
of principles of verification; progress in science occurs through the 
rejection of the old for acceptance of the new.167 Thus, science is 
not a process of moving toward a goal of finding the truth, but 
rather a movement from "what we do know" to what we want to 
know.168 
So what then is happening in a paradigm shift? Paradigm 
changes are sociological processes. Paradigms change when group 
views change; the groups in question here are those who practice in 
a particular area of science.169 Progress in science, then, is sociolog­
ical; groups trained in certain ways, with certain values, make 
choices concerning the paradigm they will follow po 
Some of the principles deployed in my explanation of science are 
irreducibly sociological, at least at this time. In particular, con­
fronted with the problem of theory-choice, the structure of my 
response runs roughly as follows: take a group of the ablest avail­
able people with the most appropriate motivation; train them in 
some science and in the specialties relevant to the choice at hand; 
imbue them with the value system, the ideology, current in their 
discipline (and to a great extent in other scientific fields as well); 
and, finally, let them make the choice. If that technique does not 
account for scientific development as we know it, then no other 
will. There can be no set of rules of choice adequate to dictate 
desired individual behaviour in the concrete cases that scientists 
will meet in the course of their careers. Whatever scientific pro­
gress may be, we must account for it by examining the nature of 
the scientific group, discovering what it values, what it tolerates, 
and what it disdains. 
That position is intrinsically sociological and, as such, a ma­
165. See id. at 111-14 (discussing the gestalt shift in perception). 
166. LUDWIG WI1TGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 194 (G.E.M. An· 
scombe trans., 3d ed. 1958). 
167. See KUHN, supra note 132, at 95-96. 
168. See id. at 171. 
169. See id. at 178-81 (stating that paradigms govern the practioners in a group 
and noting how views in those groups change during a "revolution"). 
170. See Thomas S. Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in CRmcIsM AND THE 
GROwrn OF KNOWLEDGE 231,237-38 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970). 
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jor retreat from the canons of explanation licensed by the tradi­
tions which Lakatos labels justificationism and falsificationism, 
both dogmatic and naive.171 
Further, science is a human activity not impervious to human 
wishes.l72 
To start with, it seems to me that an enterprise whose human 
character can be seen by all is preferable to one that looks 'objec­
tive', [sic] and impervious to human actions and wishes. The sci­
ences, after all, are our own creation, including all the severe 
standards they seem to impose upon us. It is good to be con­
stantly reminded of this fact. It is good to be constantly re­
minded of the fact that science as we know it today is not 
inescapable and that we may construct a world in which it plays 
no role whatever (such a world, I venture to suggest, would be 
more pleasant than the world we live in today). What better re­
minder is there than the realization that the choice between theo­
ries which are sufficiently general to provide us with a 
comprehensive world view and which are empirically discon­
nected may become a matter of taste? That the choice of our 
basic cosmology may become a matter of taste? 
Secondly, matters of taste are not completely beyond the 
reach of argument. Poems, for example, can be compared in 
grammar, sound structure, imagery, rhythm, and can be evalu­
ated on such a basis (cf. Ezra Pound on progress in poetry). 
Even the most elusive mood can be analysed, and must be 
analysed if the purpose is to present it in a manner that can either 
be enjoyed, or that increases the emotional (cognitive, percep­
tual) inventory of the reader. Every poet who is not completely 
irrational compares, improves, [and] argues until he finds the cor­
rect formulation of what he wants to say. Would it not be mar­
vellous if this process played a role in the sciences also?173 
That science is, at its core, a sociological process infected with 
personal and social prejudices, as well as the uncertainty common 
to all human endeavors, should hardly come as a shock. Quantum 
theory reveals that human observations of events are merely ap­
proximate and never entirely precise.174 Apart from the limits on 
171. Id. 
172. Paul Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist, in CRITICISM AND THE 
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 170, at 197, 228. 
173. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
174. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle finds that in measuring the velocity of a 
particle we affect our ability to measure its position and vice versa. E.g., Werner 
Heisenberg, The Physical Content of Quantum Kinematics and Mechanics, in QUAN­
498 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:467 
observation itself, the sociological nature of science is also betrayed 
in scientific literature. Archeologist Vine Deloria, Jr., for example, 
lashes out at the archeological community as a timid, authority re­
vering group.175 
Deloria's scientists are "incredibly timid people," crippled by an 
excessive reverence for authority and orthodoxy. Many subjects, 
no matter how interesting, are simply prohibited because they 
call into question long-standing beliefs." [sic] Prestigious people 
are permitted to dominate entire fields of inquiry, which are 
"populated by little people trying to protect their status [and] 
some areas of 'science' have not progressed in decades." He sin­
gles out Harvard historian Samuel Eliot Morison and the Smith­
sonian's Ales Hrdlicka as heavy-handed zealots who dominated 
conventional academic inquiry in their day, defending the intel­
lectual status quo at all costs and quashing research proposals 
designed to explore alternative possibilities. Deloria concludes 
that "like any other group of priests and politicians ... scientists 
lie and fudge their conclusions as much as the most distrusted 
professions in our society-lawyers and car dealers. "176 
The human aspect of science is also evident from scandals re­
lating to falsification of scientific results, even where this falsifica­
tion is considered not to affect the ultimate outcome of scientific 
studies.177 These all too human aspects of science have added fuel 
to the fire of public mistrust of science.178 
TUM THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 62, 62-84 (John Archibold Wheeler & Wojciech Hu­
bert Zurek eds., 1983) (explaining Heisenberg's uncertainty theory in detail); see also 
NICK HERBERT, QUANTUM REALITY 68 (1985) (stating that to attain absolute precision 
in a velocity determination would result in a lack of any knowledge of the particle's 
position, and vice versa). Thus, absolute precision in measurement is not a possibility 
and neither is absolute "truth." We are, then, even according to science itself, locked in 
a universe that precludes us from that certainty that many have thought was the prom­
ise of science. This uncertainty is an element of the human condition. 
Note that while the uncertainty principle is often viewed as a disturbance caused by 
measurement, both Heisenberg and Niels Bohr "claimed that this relation [that existed 
between conjugate attributes like velocity and position] marked the limits beyond 
which classical notions concerning attributes could not be pushed." Id. at 110. 
Whatever the foundation of the uncertainty principle, it illustrates the necessarily lim­
ited, necessarily human aspects of science. 
175. David Hurst Thomas, One Archaeologist's Perspective on the Monte Verde 
Controversy (1999) (alteration in original) (citations omitted), at http://www.archaeo 
logy.orglonline/features/clovis/thomas.html (last visited Nov. 13,2000) (on file with the 
Western New England Law Review). 
176. Id. (citation omitted). 
177. See Steven Benowitz, Observers Say Fisher Case Highlights Flaws in System, 
SCIENTIST, Mar. 31, 1997, at 1, 3 (noting one such scandal). 
178. Cf Celia Hall, Doctors Call For GM Ban to Ease Public Fears, DAILY TELE­
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Science does not differ from philosophy and the arts in that all 
are subject to human vicissitudes and uncertainty, and all proceed 
through revolutions and periods of normal practice after such revo­
lutions.179 Furthermore, the availability of testable results does not 
distinguish science from all other fields-some social sciences also 
have testable results.180 In fact, the present sciences progressed 
from natural philosophy and proto-sciences, and it is likely that 
other fields will advance to be "scientific" in this way as well.181 
This is not to say that science and non-science are the same-sci­
ence does differ from non-science in that there are obvious forms of 
progress that are perceptible in scientific fields.182 Technological in­
novation is an obvious example of such progress. 
It is not surprising that Kuhn's theory has critics. The objec­
tions range from accusations that Kuhn views science as "irrational" 
to labeling Kuhn a relativist.183 The former objection points out 
that Kuhn does not allow for objective bases for choices among 
competing paradigms; rather, the choices are purely sociological.184 
Kuhn concedes that in choice of theory or paradigm there is no 
argument that resembles a proof as used in logic or mathematics.185 
This does not mean, however, that scientists, in the sociological pro­
cess of choosing among paradigms, do not use logic or have good 
reasons for their choices.186 Indeed, in making these choices, scien­
tists do have good reasons such as the theory's accuracy, its scope, 
simplicity, and fruitfulness.187 Kuhn is not claiming that there are 
not good reasons for choosing one paradigm over another, but 
rather, that the reasons for the choices are values of the particular 
GRAPH, May 18, 1999, at http://www.millennium-debate.org!teI18May3.htm (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2000) (on file with the Western New England Law Review); Nature World 
Conference on Science, Guidelines Endorsed for 'New Social Contract Between Science 
and Society' (1999) (discussing the World Conference of Science held in Budapest and 
its recommendation to the science community and its relationship with society), at http:! 
lhelix.nature.comlwcs.02-1a.h tm!. 
179. See Kuhn, supra note 170, at 243-44. 
180. See id. at 244. 
181. Id. at 245. 
182. Id. at 244-45. 
183. Id. at 259; see also Feyerabend, supra note 172, at 197-98 (criticizing Kuhn's 
theories); Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH AND KNOWLEDGE, supra note 170, at 
154-55 (stating that Kuhn is wrong). 
184. See Lakatos, supra note 183, at 177; see also Feyerabend, supra note 172, at 
213-14. 
185. Kuhn, supra note 170, at 260. 
186. Id. at 261. 
187. Id. 
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scientific community, not rules of choice dictated by science.188 The 
values that are used to make the choices are those values that are 
shared by the scientific community.189 
Concerning the charge of relativism, Kuhn does not believe 
that anyone theory is as good as another, but does contend that it is 
wrong to talk about science being, "truth. "190 He is wary of using 
the term "truth" to describe the reason for choosing one paradigm 
over another,l91 since differing paradigms are incommensurable 
and there is no common language or set of rules that allows us to 
make choices among them in terms of "truth."192 
Science, then, is not distinguished from other disciplines by its 
objective truth-seeking nature. It is a human sociological process 
that is, in many respects, indistinguishable from the arts, literature, 
and social sciences. If it is different from these endeavors, it is due 
to its more obvious and useful results. For present purposes, it is 
enough to note that science is not a peculiar and special process, 
that, by its nature, must be accorded special respect and treatment 
in First Amendment jurisprudence. The distinction between sci­
ence and literature as speech is no more than the distinction be­
tween an article concerning genetic engineering and one discussing 
a Kandinsky oil painting; both are ultimately human activities, the 
rules of which can be explained in human sociological terms. 
There is one last way to claim a special position for science 
under the First Amendment-its utility. This argument proposes 
that the results of science are of such importance193 that the field of 
science must be subject to special protection and cannot be regu­
lated. As we have seen, however, the "truth" of speech does not 
entitle it to special protection.194 Likewise, its utility should not en­
title it to special protection. Moreover, if utility were a ground for 
special protection of speech, how would this utility be determined 
and by whom? The possibilities of abuse of such a concept are ob­
188. Id. at 262-63. 
189. Id. 

190, Id. at 264-65. 

191. Id. 
192. See id. at 266-67 (noting the incommensurability of various scientific 
theories). 
193. One could deflate this argument by simply denying that science has this 
great utility. I will nonetheless assume that science has this utility for the sake of 
argument. 
194. See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text for a discussion and the 
treatment of "true" and "false" speech under the First Amendment. 
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vious. The First Amendment protects speech, not just useful 
speech. 
Neither the history of the First Amendment, nor the nature of 
science justifies unique treatment for science in First Amendment 
jurisprudence. While the Founding Fathers were keenly interested 
in science, they were keenly interested in many other things, and we 
cannot surmise that science was thought special among these inter­
ests.195 The nature of science as the search for "truth" also does not 
warrant unique treatment of scientific speech and conduct. Science, 
like other human endeavors, is a sociological activity that cannot 
accurately be characterized as moving toward a goal of truth. Even 
if it were, true speech is generally no more protected than mistaken 
speech. 
CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment is not a shield against the popular will 
concerning animal experimentation. If, as I have hypothesized, 
Congress determined that painful animal experimentation should 
be prohibited, Congress would not violate the First Amendment by 
so legislating. Animal experimentation is conduct; it is not itself 
speech and is generally not conduct imbued with speech elements. 
As conduct, animal experimentation is subject to regulation as is 
any other form of conduct; it can be prohibited or regulated based 
upon legitimate policy determinations of the legislative branch of 
government. 
The only contrary argument is to claim that science is somehow 
special in First Amendment jurisprudence; that it is subject to pro­
tection that other forms of conduct are not. This argument gener­
ally takes the form of arguing that animal experimentation is a 
necessary prerequisite to scientific speech, and that this type of 
speech is subject to special protection based on historical or practi­
cal reasons. There is, however, no Constitutional, historical, or 
other basis on which to claim this privileged position for science. 
Science is, in fact, just another group activity that is explainable in 
sociological terms and that may be regulated in the same way, as 
are various trades, despite the blow to egos that this may generate. 
As such, it may be regulated and prohibited without encroaching on 
the First Amendment. 
195. See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Founding Fathers' interests. 
